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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
T. COLLINS JACKSON, 
Plaintvff and Appellant} 
-vs.-
l{ENDRICK HARWARD, BLAIN 
C. CURTIS, HEBER CHRISTIAN-
SON, McKAY LARSON, TEX R. 
OLSEN, SPENCER OLIN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9000 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In Respondents' brief it is urged that the Trial 
Court's action in granting a Summary Judgment was cor-
rect because: 
A. The Appellant, assuming all allegations 
of his complaint are true, has pleaded no right 
which may be protected at law or in equity. 
B. The Appellant, assuming the allegations 
of his complaint are true, has pleaded no duty on 
the part of the respondents which has been vio-
lated. 
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Appellant now relies to these contentions in the order 
stated. 
STATE11ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
A. THE APPELLANT HAS PLEADED A RIGHT WHICH 
MAY BE PROTECTED AT LAW OR IN EQUITY. 
B. THE APPELLANT HAS SUFFICIENTLY PLEADED 
A DUTY ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS WHICH 
HAS BEEN VIOLATED. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
POINT I 
A. THE APPELLANT HAS PLEADED A RIGHT WHICH 
MAY BE PROTECTED AT LAW OR IN EQUITY. 
Plaintiff is required to set forth as a claiin for relief 
( 1) A short and plain statenwnt of the clain1 showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief~ and (:n a de1nand 
for judgn1ent for that relief. Rule S(a), Ctah Rules of 
Civvl Procedure. The Appelant's pleadings contain these 
essentials, however the Respondents, w·hile not attacking 
these pleadings direetl)~. contend an absence of a primary 
legal right in the Appellant, and set forth seven defi-
menmes. 
The first clain1ed deficiency alleges no license or 
pennit frmn the :U..,ederal Connnunications Connnission or 
rrmn an)· other goYPrmnental or adn1inistratiYe body. 
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o) 
The simple answer to this is that none is required. See 
F.C.C. Docket 12443, where it is said: 
16. In a l\1emorandum Opnion and Order 
adopted by the Cmnmission on April 2, 1958 (In 
the Matter of Frontier Broadcasting Company, 
et al., Complainant, v. J. E. Collier and Carol 0. 
1\::rummel, db/as Laramie Community TV Conl-
pany, et al., defendant), the Commission an-
nounced its conclusion that it does not possess 
licensing or regulatory jurisdiction over com-
munity antenna television systems. We may here 
note briefly the basis on which the conclusion of 
non-jurisdiction over CATV systems was reached. 
First, it was concluded that they are not carriers. 
Second, even assuming they were carriers, their 
operations are typically intrastate, whereas the 
Act gives the Commission regulatory jurisdiction 
over only these common carriers operating facili-
ties which provide interstate or foreign communi-
cations service. Finally, it seemed clear that. since 
their operation is confined to the transmission 
of television programs to subscribers over closed 
circuit cable systems, there is no basis on which 
to assume licensing or regulatory powers over 
CATV systems as users of the radio spectrum 
under Title III of the Communications Act. 
The second and third claimed deficiencies allege that 
Appellant has no franchise from Sevier County, in viola-
tion of Article XII, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution and 
Section 17-5-39, Utah Code Annotated (1953) or from 
any municipality within Sevier County, in violation of 
the same constitutional provisions and Section 10-8-1-1-, 
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Utah Code Annotated (1953). Appellant has admitted 
that he has no such franchise and has answered by way 
of interrogatory number 10 that he claims the right to 
operate without formal franchise, by user and implied 
consent from the governing body of Sevier County. This 
raises a genuine issue of fact. l\1oreover, the Constitution-
al and Statutory provisions cited by Respondent do not 
require that Appellant obtain a franchise as a condition 
precedent to doing business nor do they take from Ap-
pellant the right to conduct his business. They merely 
grant to these governing bodies the right to require fran-
chises under certain conditions. At no time material 
to this lawsuit has any governing body within Sevier 
County enacted a resolution requiring that Appellant ob-
tain a franchise. 
The fourth claimed deficiency alleges that during all 
times material to these proceedings _.._-\._ppellant has been 
subject to a contract authorizing the use of utility poles 
for carrying his line, which provides as a condition pre-
cedent that he rnust secure all local franchises required 
by law. What has been said above in answer to claimed 
deficiencies two and three are equally applicable to this 
fourth clai1ned deficiency. Even if the terms of the con-
tract were violated, ·which Appellant denies. this would 
only give rise to a dispute between the contracting par-
ties, nauwl~· Telluride Power Cmupany and Appellant, 
and would not destro~· any primar~· legal rights of Appel-
lant. 
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The fifth clai1ned deficiency alleges that at all times 
material to these proceedings, Appellant has operated 
under an unregistered assumed name, contrary to the 
provisions of Section 42-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 
( 1953). Violation of this provision does not take any of 
the legal- rights of the offender, but renders an offender 
guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 42-2-4, Utah Code An-
notated (1953). The purpose of this statute is to give 
notice to the public of the nan1e or nmnes of persons con-
ducting or owning a business, and to protect those who 
would transact business with persons under an assumed 
name. Putnam v. The Industrial Commi'ssion, 80 Utah 
187, 14 P. 2d 973. Respondents make no claim that they 
or any other person has been misled. It has also been held 
that provisions for assumed nmnes are inapplicable to 
torts. See 38 Am. Jur. 600. 
The sixth and seventh claimed deficiencies alleged 
that Appellant has been capturing a fugitive television 
signal without paying any consideration for or contribut-
ing to the production thereof and that he is a "receiver" 
rather than a "broadcaster" and as a receiver is attempt-
ing to "reap where he has not sown." Appellant contends 
that this claimed defiviency is wholly immaterial. The 
pleadings claiming damages will necessitate findings of 
fact showing the inveshnent Appellant has in this busi-
ness, in such things as master antennae located high on 
mountain peaks, frmn which lead wires and pole lines 
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extend over great distances to customers' receiving sets. 
Appellant's business is recognized and duplicated by 
other such entrepreneurs all over the United States. The 
case of Scroll Realty Corp. v; Mandell, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 813 
(N.Y. 1949), involved the question whether a tenant in an 
apartinent house could maintain a television antenna on 
the roof in view of a lease provision forbidding drilling 
into any part of the building. That court held that the 
provision precluded such antenna, but went on to say that 
it 1night be realistic and practical to provide a n1aster 
.aerial on the apartment house from which leader lines 
could be run to the various tenants, providing for a fair 
and reasonable rental for such service. In a case before 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1956, in order to 
decide a tax 1natter, the Court described th~ ~unction of 
a business analagous to Appellant's. There a community 
antenna system was described as consisting of "the gath-
ering, transn1ission and delivery of broadcast sound and 
picture television signals frmn owned central high towers 
located on land leased or owned by it ... '' The descrip-
tion goes on to recite that the entrepreneurs collect a 
connection charge plus a 1nonthly seiTiee fee. Lilly r. 
United States, :2~~8 F.:2d 58-1: (4th Cir. 1956). For further 
evidence of the recognition of this sort of conduct as a 
lm~inP~~ possP~sing inherent rights see F.O.C. Docket 
N u m!Jcrs 11611, 11331, 1:211G, and 1:2-1:-1:3. The fact of the 
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matter is, Appellant and his counterparts elsewhere, far 
from conducting a business without paying any consider-
ation therefore (or reaping where he has not sown), have 
invested substantial sums in supplying television to areas 
not capable of receiving the signal from the mother trans-
mitting station. The other cases cited by Respondent 
under this heading are not in point, for there are no issues 
raised in the pleadings pertaining to proprietary rights 
of the product televised such as a heavyweight fight, I 
Love Lucy, or other shows which are copyrighted. The 
issue here is more nearly analagous to a person contami-
nating the water of a private water supply system. 
B. THE APPELLANT HAS SUFFICIENTLY PLEADED 
A DUTY ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS WHICH 
HAS BEEN VIOLATED. 
The Appellant clain1s that he has sufficiently pleaded 
a duty on the part of Respondents by his allegations in 
the first cause of action in trespass; second cause of 
action in negligence; third cause of action in nuisance; 
fourth cause of action in inducing breach of contract; 
fifth cause of action in conspiracy; and sixth cause of 
action for punative relief for malice. These actions were 
all known at common law. 
Respondent contends variously that they have no 
duty because they have sovereign iminunity for their 
acts, because except for defendants Olin and Larson they 
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are all elected County Officials; also that their conduct 
is lawful; and that Appellant seeks to take advantage of 
the federal licensing statute for broadcasting, for his own 
advantage to eliminate cmnpetition. 
Each defense asserted under this section of their re-
ply necessarily argues genuine issues of fact to reach 
the proffered conclusion. Respondents say that they 
were compelled to supply television to Sevier County by 
the provision of Section 11-2-1, and 11-:2-:2, [Ttah Code 
Annotated (1953). That statute restricted the governing 
bodies to the use of translators, but the Respondents did 
not follow the Statute. Appellant's complaint alleges that 
the Respondents are using boosters without- first obtain-
ing a license, contrary to federal law. (See complaint, 
paragraph 5.) Respondents have neither admitted nor 
denied this allegation. Appellant concedes that elective 
county officials are immune fron1liability when perform-
ing their governmental functions, but ~lppellant is un-
able to understand how Respondents can invoke this im-
munity without pleading it, and without resolving the 
issue as to whether they are cmnplying with the very 
statute from which they seek their in1n1unity. 
Respondents' point that Appellant is seeking to 
eliminate his emnpetition is both inunaterial and absurd. 
Their brief attl'mpts to equate their own failure to haYl' 
an :B-,.C.C.license for an unlicenseable booster, with Appel-
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nores the rules of the federal statutes set forth in para-
grapll five of Appellant's complaint and the decisions of 
the F.C.C., see F.O.O. Docket nttmbers 111611, 11331, 
12116 and 12443. As previously shown, Appellant does 
not require a license. 
Appellant has laid his complaint on common law 
causes of action, asking for redress for wrongs committed 
directly against hiin. This is not an application before 
the Federal Communications Commission to determine 
who should get a license, or whether someone is broad-
casting in violation of any license. 
Finally, Respondents take cmnfort from the case of 
C. J. Community Servi,ces v. F.O.O., 246 F. 2d 660, and 
chide Appellant for maintaining that "boosters are still 
unlawful." Only a cursory reading of that case will 
demonstrate that this is the case that extends beyond any 
doubt that the F.C.C. has the smne jurisdiction over tele-
vision broadcasting that it previously held, unquestion-
ably, over radio. The dictum of the case suggested that 
the :B-,.C.C. look into the feasibility of booster television. 
The F.-C.C. Dockets referred to, supra, are conclusive of 
the question that the F.C.C. has studied this issue both be-
fore and after the decision and that they are still un-
licenseable and therefore illegal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff and Appellant has pleaded a right which 
may be protected at law and in equity and has pleaded 
a duty on the part of Respondent, which has been violat-
ed. The Trial Court erred in granting the l\1otion for 
Summary Judgment since genuine issues of fact material 
to the cause of plaintiff and Appellant are outstanding. 
The judgment of the Trial Court should therefore be re-
versed and the cause remanded to the District Court for a 
trial on the merits of the case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEN D. BROWNING, and 
JOHN H. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake ·City 1, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
